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VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260415T124313Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Taipei:20231206T143000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Taipei:20231206T163000
SUMMARY:Lecture 2
UID:20260416T214230Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c
TZID:Asia/Taipei
LOCATION:No.85\, Sec. 4\, Roosevelt Rd.\,\, Taipei\, Taiwan
DESCRIPTION:<p>&bull\;Title: We Have Positive Epistemic Duties</p>\n<p>&bull\;Date: 12/06</p>\n<p>&bull\;Time: 14:30-16:30</p>\n<p>&bull\;Abstract: This lecture examines evidence-uncritical claims about what people should or shouldn&rsquo\;t believe. It argues that in some cases\, people should believe certain propositions. To put it more vividly: we sometimes have positive epistemic duties. This position runs contrary to a current trend within epistemology that sees normative epistemology as limited to issuing permissions and proscriptions and never giving us prescriptions. I argue that the acceptance of certain paradigm negative epistemic duties commits us to the existence of positive epistemic duties. Along the way\, I argue for a second conclusion. Contrary to the popular view called evidentialism\, what we should or shouldn&rsquo\;t believe (in the evidence-uncritical sense) is not merely a function of the evidence we have. It depends as well on our abilities and opportunities.&nbsp\;</p>
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