&bull\;Date: 12/10
\n&bull\;Time: 09:10-10:50
\n&bull\;Abstract: The final lecture turns to evidence-critical claims about what we should or shouldn&rsquo\;t believe. It asks whether such claims are epistemic in a strict sense that is connected to the notion of knowledge. I ask: does the evidence one should have had matter to what one epistemically should or shouldn&rsquo\;t have believed? My response has two parts. First\, in a strict sense\, the answer is no. Only evidence-uncritical claims about what we should or shouldn&rsquo\;t believe are epistemic\, not evidence-critical claims. However\, we should not think that evidence-critical claims rely on some entirely distinct form of normativity &ndash\; chocolate as opposed to vanilla\, if you will. Rather\, and this is the second claim\, evidence-critical claims about what we should or shouldn&rsquo\;t believe depend for their truth both on strictly non-epistemic norms concerning evidence possession and on a strictly epistemic norms concerning belief given one&rsquo\;s evidence (and abilities and opportunities). The resulting position could be expressed this way: being a good doctor\, a good parent\, a good inquirer consists in part but not in whole in believing in an epistemically appropriate way on the relevant issues. \;
\n&bull\;Note: This lecture serves as the keynote speech of the Fifth Taiwan Philosophical Colloquium (https://philevents.org/event/show/112466)
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