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VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260415T014141Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20231128T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20231128T183000
SUMMARY:False measures in the science and philosophy of consciousness
UID:20260415T052544Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Senate House\, London\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract:</strong> According&nbsp\; to a widespread contemporary view of the mind\, consciousness plays less&nbsp\; of a role than was traditionally assumed: much of perception\, decision&nbsp\; and action occur independently of our conscious experiences. I will&nbsp\; criticise one central line of scientific support for this view\, which&nbsp\; measures consciousness by a subject&rsquo\;s capacity to identify and&nbsp\; discriminate their experiences and actions. This style of measurement&nbsp\; underestimates consciousness\, and is not justified even if we grant&nbsp\; that\, necessarily\, subjects are aware of their own conscious&nbsp\; experiences. In search of a better measure\, I look to philosophical&nbsp\; accounts of the first-order\, demonstrative thoughts most immediately&nbsp\; related to conscious perception and action. But here we find the same&nbsp\; problem: our best philosophical account individuates these thoughts by&nbsp\; subjects&rsquo\; capacity to discriminate their experiences. I trace the&nbsp\; problem to broadly Fregean criteria for individuating thoughts\, propose a&nbsp\; related solution\, and discuss implications for the science of&nbsp\; consciousness.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Hugo Heagren;CN=Sean Maroney;CN=Sam Kang:
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