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DTSTAMP:20260711T020755Z
DTSTART;TZID=Africa/Cairo:20231127T130000
DTEND;TZID=Africa/Cairo:20231127T143000
SUMMARY:Leibniz’s Idealism and the Problem of Extension
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TZID:Africa/Cairo
LOCATION:AUC Avenue 1\, New Cairo\, Egypt
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract</strong>:&nbsp\;What are\, for Leibniz\, bodies\, matter\, and corporeal substances? In this paper\, I argue that&nbsp\;there is a significant strand in this thinking which combines both an idealistic and a realistic&nbsp\;view of the physical world according to which the only substances are mind-like\, and yet matter&nbsp\;and the bodies it constitutes are nonetheless real because they themselves are constituted by&nbsp\;the mind-like substances. Although this interpretation enjoys significant textual support and&nbsp\;holds considerable philosophical interest\, it faces serious difficulties as well. One of these&nbsp\;concerns the nature and status of extension. As experienced by us and as theorized by the&nbsp\;natural sciences\, the physical world and its constituents are spatially extended. But if the&nbsp\;monads are mind-like\, and therefore are unextended\, how then can they constitute extended&nbsp\;things? The standard answer to this question among scholars who support the substance&nbsp\;idealist/matter realist interpretation is to claim that when we ascribe many properties to&nbsp\;bodies\, including extension\, we do so erroneously. That is\, Leibniz is committed to a kind of&nbsp\;error theory with respect to extension and other physical properties. I argue in this paper that&nbsp\;such an error theory would pose serious problems for Leibniz given some of his other central&nbsp\;philosophical commitments. In particular\, I will argue that his theory of universal expression&nbsp\;and its role in sense perception and mental representation more generally require him to hold&nbsp\;that all perception is veridical. If this is true\, then any interpretation that imputes massive error&nbsp\;to the perceptions of the monads is untenable. But this is not a reason to reject substance&nbsp\;idealism and matter realism as an interpretation of Leibniz. Instead\, I will argue that a proper&nbsp\;understanding of Leibniz&rsquo\;s theory of ideas points the way to an interpretation on which&nbsp\;extension can be veridically attributed to aggregates of unextended monads.</p>\n<p>Zoom Link</p>\n<p>https://aucegypt.zoom.us/s/99110661972</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Mario Hubert:
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