The Method\, Theory\, and Reality Speaker Series has an upcoming talk by Veronica Gomez Sanchez on "Deflationist Cognitive Science." \;
\nAbstract: According to a version of deflationism about truth\, attributions of truth-conditional contents to mental states do not play a robust role in the best scientific explanations of behavior. Theories that appear to invoke truth-conditional contents can be paraphrased in terms of less metaphysically problematic notions\, without loss in explanatory power. This talk develops a challenge for representational realism based on the availability of such deflationist paraphrases\, building on the work of Hartry Field and Frances Egan. I consider a number of popular attempts to clarify the explanatory role of content and argue that none of them yields a satisfactory response to the deflationist challenge\, as I understand it. I end by presenting a more promising response on behalf of the realist\, but show that it rests on potentially controversial assumptions about the role of truth conditions in structuring neural mechanisms.
\nZoom Link: \;https://umass-amherst.zoom.us/j/92217408527
\nMeeting ID: 922 1740 8527
\nIf you have technical difficulties\, contact Jenn McDonald at \;jrc2266@columbia.edu.
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MTR showcases work from early career philosophers in philosophy of science\, epistemology\, and metaphysics. \; Please share this series with others who are interested in philosophy of science\, epistemology\, and metaphysics. \; And follow us on Facebook or follow our webpage (both below) for information about upcoming talks and events.