BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260606T225352Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20131004T153000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20131004T170000
SUMMARY:Knowledge As Potential For Action
UID:20260613T163608Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:250 Victoria Parade\, Fitzroy\, Australia\, 3065
DESCRIPTION:<p>Knowledge&rsquo\;s <em>roles</em> are at least partly a function of what knowledge <em>is</em>. All the more so if this paper&rsquo\;s hypothesis is correct\, since I argue for a conception of knowledge-that as knowledge-how. The knowledge-how in question may be thought of as a possibly multi-pronged ability &ndash\; to do this\, that\, and/or the other: to question\, to answer\, to assert\, to represent\, to believe\, to investigate\, to move from here to there\, etc. In short\, knowledge is to be thought of as a potential for various sorts of action &ndash\; inner\, outer\, wherever. It is not merely that knowledge is a state with interesting normative links to these actions. Rather\, knowledge is the potential to perform those actions. Accordingly\, knowledge&rsquo\;s role\, generically described\, is to be the modal locus for knowing actions. This picture of knowledge is reached by applying a Rylean anti-intellectualism about intelligent actions\, by highlighting the concept of a knowing action\, and by adapting some ideas from Hume\, Descartes\, and perhaps others.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
