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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260508T115700Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20240927T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Vienna:20240928T170000
SUMMARY:Workshop on Truth\, Definability and Quantification into Sentence Position
UID:20260512T181455Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Europe/Vienna
LOCATION:Universitätsstraße 7\, Vienna\, Austria\, 1010
DESCRIPTION:<p>Can truth be defined? Frege argued that it couldn't. Ramsey argued that defining it would be easy if only we had an analysis of judgement. Today Horwich claims that truth cannot be defined explicitly because doing so would require quantification into sentence position and such quantification is not coherent. Instead he proposes a &ldquo\;minimal theory&rdquo\; of truth\, which comprises all the unproblematic instances of the equivalence schema. Künne\, by contrast\, argues that quantification into sentence position is coherent and may actually be part of some natural languages. Künne uses such quantification to define truth explicitly:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>&forall\;x (x is true iff &exist\;p ((x is the proposition that p) &amp\; p)). Or in English: a representation (belief\, assertion etc) is true just if things are as it represents them as being. Künne claims also to find this definition in Frank Ramsey&rsquo\;s posthumous work\, which\, as an exegetical claim\, is not uncontroversial.</p>\n<p>Is truth definable? Is propositional quantification coherent? Do natural languages involve propositional quantification\, and in what sense? What do the answers to these questions mean for philosophical attempts to define or explain truth? Is truth redundant if explicitly definable? Not redundant if not explicitly definable?</p>\n<p>This workshop is supported by the FWF Cluster of Excellence project "Knowledge in Crisis"\, the FWF project "Truth is Grounded in Facts" and the University of Vienna.</p>\n<p><strong>Programme</strong></p>\n<p><u>27 September 2024<br></u>Room 3B\, NIG third floor<br><br><strong>10:00 &ndash\; 11:30</strong> Wolfgang K&uuml\;nne&nbsp\;<br><em>Spelling Out a Truism about Truth&nbsp\;</em></p>\n<p>chair: Max K&ouml\;lbel<em><br><br></em><strong>11:45 &ndash\; 13:00</strong> Poppy Mankowitz&nbsp\;<br><em>Higher-Order Quantification in Natural Language</em></p>\n<p><em></em>chair: Max K&ouml\;lbel<br><br><strong>Lunch Break</strong><br><br><strong>14:45 &ndash\; 16:00</strong> Torsten Odland&nbsp\;<br><em>Does Sentential Quantification Tell Us What Truth Is?</em></p>\n<p><em></em>chair: Julio de Rizzo<br><br><strong>16:15 &ndash\; 17:30</strong> Peter Fritz <em>(talk cancelled)</em><br><em>Plural Propositional Quantification and Truth&nbsp\;</em></p>\n<p>chair: Julio de Rizzo</p>\n<p><em><br></em><u>28 September 2024<br></u>Room 3B\, NIG third floor</p>\n<p><strong>09:00 &ndash\; 10:15</strong> Cheryl Misak<br><em>Ramsey on the Indefinability of Truth</em></p>\n<p>chair: Matt Dougherty</p>\n<p><br><strong>10:30 &ndash\; 11:45</strong> Arvid B&aring\;ve&nbsp\;<br><em>Deflationism and propositional quantification</em></p>\n<p>chair: Matt Dougherty</p>\n<p><br><strong>12:00 &ndash\; 13:15</strong>&nbsp\;James Woodbridge &amp\; Bradley Armour-Garb&nbsp\;<br><em>Sentential-Variable Deflationism and Adverbial Quantification</em></p>\n<p>chair: Benjamin Schnieder<br><br><strong>Lunch break</strong></p>\n<p><strong>15:15 &ndash\; 16:30</strong> Paul Horwich<br><em>Deflationary Accounts of Truth</em></p>\n<p>chair: Benjamin Schnieder</p>\n
ORGANIZER;CN="Max Kölbel";CN=Julio De Rizzo;CN=Benjamin Schnieder:
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