Moral rights occupy a central place in contemporary moral theorizing. At the same time\, a promising hypothesis in the theory of normativity is that normative \;phenomena (including moral phenomena) can be explained in terms of reasons\, i.e.\, in terms of the factors that count in favour of actions or attitudes. The aim \;of this workshop is to investigate and discuss the relation between moral rights \;and normative reasons.
\nThe workshop will focus on (but is not limited to) \;questions such as the following:
\n·\; \; What are the connections between moral rights\, moral duties\, and moral reasons?
\n·\; \; Can rights be analysed in terms of reasons or \;should rights be regarded as reason-providing?
\n·\; \; What (if anything) do reasons-based analyses of rights imply for the justification of moral rights and for first-order moral theory?
\n·\; \; What can our best accounts of moral rights contribute to our understanding of normative reasons?
\nThere is a small number of slots available for contributions that will be selected from an open call for abstracts.
\nPlease send your abstract as a PDF file prepared for blind refereeing accompanied by a separate file containing your name\, paper title\, institutional affiliation\, and contact information to rightsandreasons@uni-bielefeld.de
\nWord limit: 500-1\,000 words (including notes but excluding bibliography). Papers should be suitable for a 40-minute presentation.
\nDeadline: July 1st\, 2024
\nWe encourage PhD students and individuals from underrepresented groups to submit. For those without access to travel funds\, we can offer accommodation during the workshop.
\nPlease direct your inquiries to dmitry.ananiev[at]uni-bielefeld.de
ORGANIZER;CN=Dmitry Ananiev;CN=Benjamin Kiesewetter: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR