BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260316T142803Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20240321T161500 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20240321T181500 SUMMARY:Quine on Quantification UID:20260319T075405Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:8c16:90ff:fea7:70aa%3 TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:Alan Gilbert Building\, room 120\, Melbourne\, Australia DESCRIPTION:

It has been said of Frege that he &lsquo\;introduced and brilliantly exploited second-order variables ranging over concepts&rsquo\; so that contemporary higher order logic &lsquo\;is a good model&rsquo\; of his logicist system. Quine has been a fierce critic of second-order logic and has consistently advocated restricting quantification to first-order variables. Second-order variables are commonly taken to range over concepts\, properties\, relations\, or functions and from early in his career\, Quine deemed these to be &lsquo\;abstract entities&rsquo\; of dubious scientific value. In this paper I ask\, do Quine&rsquo\;s objections to second-order quantification engage with Frege? I argue that they do not. Quine fails to differentiate\, within the notion of meaning\, Fregean concepts&ndash\;&ndash\; which are not objects&ndash\;&ndash\;from objects\, the referents of singular terms. Nor does he recognise the difference between the concept/object distinction and that between the sense of an expression and what is indicated by it. He has in his sights Carnapian &lsquo\;intensions\,&rsquo\; which confusedly merge Frege&rsquo\;s concept/object and sense/indication (reference) distinctions. Because he does not engage with Frege&rsquo\;s actual semantics\, Quine&rsquo\;s objections to Frege&rsquo\;s second-order quantifiers fail. Moreover\, it is argued\, once looked at in a Fregean light\, Quine&rsquo\;s account of quantification turns out to be seriously confused.

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