BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260930T121032Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20240418T153000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20240418T173000
SUMMARY:“Explaining Imagination in Terms of the Rest of Our Folk Psychology: A Challenge from the Case of Supposition”
UID:20261004T205547Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:ac83:5bff:fea0:108%3
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:level 4 250 Victoria Parade (460-4-28)\, Melbourne\, Australia
DESCRIPTION:<p>Contact organiser by email to be sent link to attend online.</p>\n<p>Abstract</p>\n<p>It is widely assumed that imagination is a basic propositional attitude\, which cannot be reduced to other parts of our folk psychology. In this respect it is more like belief and desire than\, say\, suspicion or wishing. This widespread assumption has come under recent attack in work by Peter Langland-Hassan\, especially his&nbsp\;<em>Explaining Imagination&nbsp\;</em>(2020). In this talk\, I&rsquo\;ll develop a challenge for Langland-Hassan&rsquo\;s reductionist approach\, which focuses on the case of supposition. Supposition is often treated as a kind of imagination yet\, I&rsquo\;ll argue\, we are unable to reductively explain it in terms of folk mental states apart from imagination. In closing\, I consider how we ought to think of supposition instead.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Matthew Sharpe:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR