BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260604T180834Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20240920T153000
DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20240920T170000
SUMMARY:Arguments from Analogy and the Categoricity of Moral Judgments 
UID:20260606T160023Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:America/Toronto
LOCATION:1151 Richmond Street\, London\, Canada
DESCRIPTION:<p>Abstract: Many attempts to deny that there are any genuinely categorical moral reasons can be&nbsp\;countered effectively by Arguments from Analogy (or Companions in Guilt Arguments). But one of the most challenging debates about theses Argument from Analogy pertains to their applicability to moral nihilism and the moral error theory. Error Theorists and nihilists have powerful resources at their disposal to respond to and disarm Arguments from analogy\, especially when those analogies rely on claims about the parity between moral and epistemic judgments. This talk will evaluate and respond to some recent attempts to undermine the Argument from Analogy as an effective response to error theory and nihilism.&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR