BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260311T130112Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20241018T140000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20241018T153000
SUMMARY:Explaining vague language
UID:20260314T122705Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:d4cf:baff:fea2:9582%3
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Monash Clayton Campus\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3800
DESCRIPTION:<p>Join Zoom meeting:</p>\n<p>https://monash.zoom.us/j/88062345198?pwd=R1lUUGtSOXUwdTJydVlPODB3czdSUT09&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Meeting ID: 880 6234 5198</p>\n<p>Passcode: 484858</p>\n<p>Abstract:</p>\n<p>Why is language vague? Vagueness may be explained and rationalized if<br>it can be shown that vague language is more useful to speaker and<br>hearer than precise language. In a well-known paper\, Bart Lipman<br>proposed a game-theoretic account of vagueness in terms of mixed<br>strategy that leads to a puzzle: vagueness cannot be strictly better<br>than precision at equilibrium. More recently\, we have put forward a<br>Bayesian account of vagueness establishing that using vague words can<br>sometimes be strictly more informative than using precise words (Egr&eacute\;\,<br>Spector\, Mortier\, Verheyen 2023). This paper proposes to compare both<br>results and to explain why they are not in contradiction. Lipman's<br>definition of vagueness relies exclusively on a property of signaling<br>strategies\, without making any assumptions about the lexicon\, whereas<br>our account involves a layer of semantic content. We argue that the<br>semantic account of vagueness is needed\, and more adequate and<br>explanatory of vagueness.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sandra Leonie Field:
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