GOTTLOB FREGE LECTURES IN THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY 2024: EMMA BORG (LONDON): \; REASONS FOR ACTION
\nDo people generally do what they do for the reasons they have? A standard answer in philosophy &ndash\; Common-sense or Folk Psychology &ndash\; says yes. But recently the idea that people are generally rational\, reasons-responsive creatures has come under significant pressure\, for a range of empirical findings (often generated within social\, comparative\, and developmental psychology) seem to show that\, on the contrary\, people are often reasons-blind\, behaving on the basis of gut-feels and intuitions\, and subject to numerous biases and other reasoning flaws. However\, although this empirical work is now extremely well-known (stretching beyond the ivory tower and into the public consciousness)\, I suggest that the precise problem for Common-sense Psychology remains unclear. For there are (at least) three different arguments that the empirical data could be used to support. In these lectures I clarify these three arguments and contend that\, for each one\, there are responses available to an advocate of the Common-sense view. My conclusion will be that the case against Common-sense Psychology can be rejected and that we should retain the idea that (typical adult human) action involves acting for reasons.
ORGANIZER;CN="Bruno Mölder": METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR