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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260416T232414Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Adelaide:20240912T180000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Adelaide:20240912T200000
SUMMARY:Evolution and Moral Realism: Take 2
UID:20260423T021740Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c
TZID:Australia/Adelaide
LOCATION:Adelaide\, Australia\, 5005
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract</strong>&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;A decade ago I offered a defence of naturalistic moral realism against evolutionary debunking arguments. It had two elements. One was rejecting a dichotomy between evolutionary vindication and debunking in favour of a continuum. The second (a) proposed a metaethical principle on the basis of a hypothesis about the evolutionary drivers of moral thinking: a moral principle is true if it is part of a set of moral norms which\, if acted upon\, would optimise the cooperation profits of a community\, and (b) by this criterion\, folk moral opinion was quite often approximately true. I still reject the dichotomy\, but the rest of the argument was too friendly to realist naturalism in ethics. It mis-characterised the selective history of moral thinking\, over-estimating its role as a cooperation amplifier\, and under-estimating the epistemic challenges facing individual agents as they develop their moral opinions. The upshot is a shift towards the debunking end of the vindication-debunking continuum.</p>\n<p><em>The 15th Gavin David Young Lecture in Philosophy</em></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Antony Eagle:
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