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DTSTAMP:20260824T110542Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20240912T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20240912T170000
SUMMARY:VICTR Session on the Semantic Paradoxes
UID:20260824T111619Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-757c47d5c7-kzbjc
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Virtual International Consortium for Truth Research (VICTR) is pleased to announce a&nbsp\;<strong>VICTR session on the Semantic Paradoxes\, which will take place on September 12\, 2024 via Zoom</strong>. **The zoom link will be announced closer to the time\, so stay tuned.**<br><br>The session will begin at 11:am Eastern US time. Here is a preliminary&nbsp\;schedule with titles and abstracts:&nbsp\;<br><br><strong><u>TALK 1: Anil Gupta</u></strong>\, 11 am ET (30-45 min presentation plus 15-30 min Q&amp\;A)<br><br><strong>Title: Truth\, Paradox\, Function</strong></p>\n<strong><br></strong>\n<strong>Abstract</strong>: I will draw attention to some functions served by the concept of truth\, and I will point out the problem paradoxes present in accounting for these functions. I will go on to argue that revision theory\, and only this theory\, provides a satisfactory account of these&nbsp\;functions. The talk will be self-contained and will not presuppose prior knowledge of revision theory.<br><br><br><strong><u>TALK 2: Elia Zardini</u></strong>\, 12.20 pm ET (30-45 min presentation plus 15-30&nbsp\;min Q&amp\;A)<br><br><strong>Title</strong>: Totality=Every\; Dependence=Some\; Choice=Any\; Chance=A Certain<br><br><strong>Abstract</strong>: Noncontractive logics have found interesting applications to the semantic paradoxes (among other philosophical problems). Yet\, while their proof theory and formal semantics are relatively well-understood and developed\, they still lack an informal interpretation in broadly truth-theoretic terms that makes sense of their distinguishing features. This paper aims to provide just that. In more detail\, I&rsquo\;ll first propose an interpretation of the multiplicative/additive distinction among operators arising in a noncontractive logic (focusing mostly on the quantifiers): multiplicative operators represent taking their operands together (with universal quantification representing totality and particular quantification representing dependence) whereas additive operators represent arbitrarily taking an operand (with universal quantification representing choice and particular quantification representing chance). I&rsquo\;ll then argue that the conceptual resources used by the proposed interpretation are by no means idiosyncratic\, but widespread in all areas of our thought and talk. In particular\, reflection on the behaviour of natural-language determiners points towards a very natural working hypothesis that associates: multiplicative universal affirmative with &lsquo\;every&rsquo\;\; multiplicative&nbsp\;particular affirmative with &lsquo\;some&rsquo\;\; additive universal affirmative with &lsquo\;any&rsquo\;\; additive particular affirmative with &lsquo\;a certain&rsquo\;. I&rsquo\;ll illustrate the fruitfulness of this hypothesis with four examples\, from the epistemic\, normative\, attitudinal and stative domains respectively. I&rsquo\;ll close by drawing the consequence this hypothesis has for a novel type of revision of classical logic.<br><br><strong>LUNCH BREAK</strong>&nbsp\;(even if it's an online workshop)<br><br><strong><u>TALK 3: Miriam Bowen</u></strong>\, 2.15 pm ET (30-45 min presentation plus 15-30 min&nbsp\;Q&amp\;A)<br><br><strong>Title</strong>: Liars\, Credences and Logical Nihilism<br><br><strong>Abstract</strong>: TBA<br><br><br><strong><u>TALK 4: Hartry Field</u></strong>\, 3.35 pm ET (30-45 min presentation plus 15-30 min&nbsp\;Q&amp\;A)<br><br><strong>Title</strong>: Well-Behaved Truth<br><br><strong>Abstract</strong>: Common-sense reasoning with truth involves both (i) the use of classical logic and (ii) the assumption of the transparency of truth (the equivalence between a sentence and the attribution of truth to it). The semantic paradoxes show that at least one of these must go\, and different theorists make different choices. But whatever one's choice\, it's valuable to carve out one or more domains where common sense reasoning ((i) and (ii) together) can be safely used\; domains where everything is *well-behaved*. In this talk I'll explore a method of adding a predicate of well-behavedness to various truth theories\, which works for both classical and nonclassical theories (including&nbsp\;non-classical theories with special conditionals). With such a predicate\, one can reason more easily\, and formulate and prove generalizations that are unavailable without such a predicate. Besides their intrinsic interest\, these generalizations greatly increase theproof-theoretic strength of axiomatic theories.&nbsp\; (There are some previous proposals for adding a well-behavedness predicate to specific classical theories\, and others for adding one to non-classical theories without special conditionals.&nbsp\; The current proposal\, besides being general\, is also more satisfactory in the individual cases\, and is the only one I know of for non-classical theories with conditionals.)<br><br><br>The Virtual International Consortium for Truth Research (VICTR) is sponsored by the Future of Truth project at the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute\, the University of Waikato\, Fairmont State University\, the University of Alabama\, and the Applied Ethics Institute at Utica University.<br><br>To join VICTR&rsquo\;s mailing list\, email&nbsp\;cwrenn@ua.edu</a>\, or&nbsp\;VICTRgroup@gmail.com</a>.<br><br>\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Susanna Melkonian-Altshuler;CN=Douglas Edwards;CN=Adam C. Podlaskowski;CN=Robert Barnard;CN=Filippo Ferrari;CN=Poppy Mankowitz;CN=Will Gamester:
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