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VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260416T065028Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20241004T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20241005T170000
SUMMARY:Bad Beliefs\, Echo Chambers\, and Social Epistemology
UID:20260419T115316Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Universitätsstraße 150\, Bochum\, Germany\, 44801
DESCRIPTION:<p>Some of the epistemically bad beliefs do not cause any obvious harm to others\, but some\, such as propaganda\, are both epistemically and morally bad. Cognitive science\, drawing on empirical evidence from social psychology and neuroscience\, contradicts the ethics of beliefs about bad beliefs. Whereas the ethics of beliefs normatively demands responsibility for bad beliefs\, as well as for preventable ignorance\, cognitive science finds quite rational justifications for this. The epistemic behavior of people who hold bad beliefs\, such as engaging in conspiracy theories or hateful propaganda\, is not just personally motivated but is predominantly beneficial to the individual within the group. Bad beliefs become extremely persistent due to the echo chamber effect\, which also contributes to further polarization of groups\, and unlike epistemic bubbles\, there are no obvious ways to break down echo chambers. Can social epistemology find a balance between the strict requirements of individualistic ethics of beliefs (Clifford's principle) and the descriptive approach of cognitive science to bad beliefs and echo chambers?</p>\n<p><br>Bad beliefs are unjustified. Are they embedded in the belief system of a person or rather isolated? What is the right way to analyze immunity to evidence and its impact on a person's belief system? Do echo chambers serve a protective function in this context? What are the epistemic\, cognitive\, social\, and affective conditions of echo chambers? Can echo chambers be adequately described as a convenient environment for protection from moral culpability and epistemic responsibility\, as well as a source of moral blindness and epistemic ignorance?</p>\n<p><br>Do we have a duty to pursue epistemic virtues and avoid epistemic vices? Does the responsibility for bad beliefs in a group diminish or should it be distributed evenly among its members? Are people naive enough to believe in political propaganda\, and can propaganda change beliefs en masse?<br>These and many other related questions arising in this context will be discussed by experts in the field.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Tobias Schlicht;CN=Nikola Kompa;CN=Olena Komar:
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