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DTSTAMP:20260415T054625Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241028T151500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241028T164500
SUMMARY:The Intentional Action of Group Agents: Not so Simple
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>The Collective Ethics Seminar: Online Presentation &ndash\; 28 October 2024 &ndash\; 15.15 &ndash\; 16.45 CET / 09.15 &ndash\; 10.45 EST.</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Kenneth Silver </strong><strong>(Trinity College Dublin) </strong><strong>- </strong><strong>&ldquo\;The Intentional Action of Group Agents: Not so Simple</strong><strong></strong></p>\n<p>On Monday 28 October 2024\, Kenneth Silver will give an online presentation at the Collective Ethics Seminar entitled &ldquo\;The Intentional Action of Group Agents: Not so Simple&rdquo\;.</p>\n<p><strong>Abstract:&nbsp\;</strong>Many social ontologists and business ethicists claim that certain group agents\, organizations\, and corporations are capable of being distinctly morally responsible\, and responsible for specific instances of intentional agency. However\, common cases of apparent group intentional agency do not seem to involve any specific intention of the group itself\, let alone a group intention to perform that particular action. This raises a question about how to square group intentional agency with ongoing conversations in the philosophy of action about the nature and role of intentions in intentional action generally. In particular\, there are defenders of the so-called Simple View of Intentional Action\, on which an agent intentionally acts&nbsp\;only if she has the intention to so act. This paper highlights a tension between banal examples of apparent group agency and the Simple View\, and it considers six responses. While I have a preferred response\, this paper begins a conversation about the kinds of trade-offs to be expected in negotiating intentional agency in the context of groups\, a topic that is ultimately not so simple.<strong></strong></p>\n<p>The online seminar is open for all to attend. The session starts at 15.15 CET / 09.15 EST. You can join the session via the following link: <a href="https://univienna.zoom.us/j/62736288881?pwd=SndEdTNoNlZtSzJqcmpabm5NaWIyUT09">https://univienna.zoom.us/j/62736288881?pwd=SndEdTNoNlZtSzJqcmpabm5NaWIyUT09</a><br> <br> For more information about the seminar and the schedule for 2024S\, please see <u><a href="https://social.univie.ac.at/events/collective-ethics-seminar/">https://social.univie.ac.at/events/collective-ethics-seminar/</a></u>.<br> <br> We hope to see you at the seminar!<br> <br> Kind regards\,<br> <br> Gunnar Bj&ouml\;rnsson (Stockholm University)\, Olle Blomberg (University of Gothenburg)\, and Niels de Haan (University of Vienna)</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Niels de Haan;CN=Olle Blomberg;CN="Gunnar Björnsson":
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