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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260507T122341Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241024T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241024T193000
SUMMARY:Why There Can Be Numbers
UID:20260509T094337Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>In a recent paper\, David Builes defends the following argument against mathematical Platonism:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p><br> "1. Necessarily\, there are no bare particulars.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>2. Necessarily\, if there are abstract mathematical objects\, then there are bare particulars.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>3. Therefore\, necessarily\, there are no abstract mathematical objects."</p>\n<p><br> There are many ways to resist this argument\, some of which I will briefly summarize before focusing on one particular problem with it. Premise 2 depends on the assumption that any intrinsic property an abstract mathematical object might instantiate is "merely negative" or otherwise non-"sparse"\, such that bearing such a property does not suffice to make a particular non-bare. For many such properties\, this is a problematically question-begging assumption. However\, I conclude by explaining how Builes's argument\, and this particular problem with it\, shine light on some underexplored questions in the metaphysics of mathematics.</p>\n<p>link:&nbsp\;https://us06web.zoom.us/j/87649813438&nbsp\;</p>
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