The idea that intentionality is fundamental to our understanding of the mental was first explicitly formulated by Brentano\, and has been central within philosophy since. Exactly how fundamental intentionality is\, and exactly what it amounts to &ndash\; ways of thinking about the world\, linguistic meaning\, mental content (of various kinds)\, acquaintance\, and/or some kind of skillful coping &ndash\; remain however controversial issues. Different answers to these questions are also pursued within different philosophical traditions: phenomenological\, transcendental\, analytic\, pragmatic\, scientific naturalistic (cognitive science) and so on. The aim of this conference is to try to cast light on the notion of intentionality in a way that also brings out how the notion features within the explanatory tasks of these different philosophical traditions\, and how these relate to one another.
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The conference is arranged under the auspices of Representationalism or Anti-representationalism? Perspectives on Intentionality from Philosophy and Cognitive Science. \;
See also call for abstracts.
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