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DTSTAMP:20260605T220041Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20241125T151500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20241125T164500
SUMMARY:Normativity and Psychology in Agreement (and Promises to Boot)
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TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>The Collective Ethics Seminar: Online Presentation &ndash\; 25 November 2024 &ndash\; 15.15 &ndash\; 16.45 CET / 09.15 &ndash\; 10.45 EST.</strong><br> <br> <strong>Abe Roth (Ohio State University) - Normativity and Psychology in Agreement (and Promises to Boot)</strong><br> <strong><br> </strong>On Monday 25 November 2024\, Abe Roth will give an online presentation at the Collective Ethics Seminar entitled &ldquo\;Normativity and Psychology in Agreement (and Promises to Boot)&rdquo\;</p>\n<p>Abstract: In promising to do something\, one acquires an obligation to do it\, at least all things being equal.&nbsp\; Similarly\, in forming an agreement with another\, one is obligated to do one&rsquo\;s part.&nbsp\; But to talk only of what one is obligated or required to do neglects something of normative significance:&nbsp\; the special relationship holding between parties of a promise or an agreement.&nbsp\; This relationship is constituted in part by the rights the promisee holds against the promisor\, or the rights of parties to an agreement against one another.&nbsp\; How should this relationship and these rights be understood?&nbsp\; I consider several approaches.&nbsp\; </p>\n<p>One approach understands the right of the promisee in terms of notions of moral responsibility\, in particular the idea that the promisor is accountable to the promisee to do as promised.&nbsp\; Another approach thinks of these rights in terms of the distinctive normative power that the promisee possesses with respect to what the promisor is obligated to do\, such as the power to release the promisor from the obligation.&nbsp\; After raising questions about the moral accountability and normative powers views\, I consider two approaches invoking the resources of a theory of joint agency.&nbsp\; The <em>joint commitment</em> approach emphasizes the symmetry and equal status of participants\, which might make it a more natural fit for agreements.&nbsp\; The <em>practical intimacy</em> approach offers a concrete realization of the authority of the promisee in settling what the promisor does\, and better accommodates the asymmetrical normative situation in the case of promising. </p>\n<p><br> The online seminar is open for all to attend. The session starts at 15.15 CET / 09.15 EST. You can join the session via the following link: <a href="https://univienna.zoom.us/j/62736288881?pwd=SndEdTNoNlZtSzJqcmpabm5NaWIyUT09">https://univienna.zoom.us/j/62736288881?pwd=SndEdTNoNlZtSzJqcmpabm5NaWIyUT09</a><br> <br> For more information about the seminar and the schedule for 2024S\, please see <u><a href="https://social.univie.ac.at/events/collective-ethics-seminar/">https://social.univie.ac.at/events/collective-ethics-seminar/</a></u>.<br> <br> We hope to see you at the seminar!<br> <br> Kind regards\,<br> <br> Gunnar Bj&ouml\;rnsson (Stockholm University)\, Olle Blomberg (University of Gothenburg)\, and Niels de Haan (University of Vienna)</p>\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Niels de Haan;CN="Gunnar Björnsson";CN=Olle Blomberg:
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