Species are the fundamental taxonomic unit of evolutionary biology. However\, how to best think about species is controversial in both the biological and philosophical literature\, and different characterizations of species results both in different ways of understanding the nature of species and in how species are counted. Disputes regarding how best to think of species spill
\n\nover into whether species are natural kinds\, individuals\, historical entities\, etc. In this presentation\, after outlining the mitonuclear compatibility species concept (MCSC)\, we flesh out some ostensible philosophical consequences. Specifically\, although the consensus amongst philosophers of biology is that (kind) essentialism about species is wrong\, so that species at most have relational essences\, we appeal to the MCSC to defend a thoroughgoing intrinsic essentialism. Namely\, the doctrine that species have essences that are fully intrinsic and\, thus\, are natural kinds (of sorts)\, while allowing that species aren&rsquo\;t categorically distinct (or\, alternatively\, that species-membership is sometimes indeterminate).
\n\n ORGANIZER;CN=Elay Shech;CN=Alison Springle: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR