Contemporary neuroscientific explanations regularly refer to internal neural entities as &ldquo\;representations&rdquo\; of distal content. Talk of &ldquo\;information processing&rdquo\; or &ldquo\;coding&rdquo\; in the brain is ubiquitous throughout neuroscientific practice\, and it is generally assumed that such processes require internal &ldquo\;neural representations&rdquo\;. But the nature of these representations has been the focus of substantial debate. What are neuroscientists committed to when they regard a neural state as representing some specific content? What empirical evidence is necessary to justify such claims? What defines the content of a neural representation? Are neural representations dependent on the subjective considerations of researchers\, or do they exist\, as representations\, independently of our explanatory practices? These questions are central to current neuroscientific practice and have garnered much attention in the philosophical community. The conference aims to tackle these issues by bringing together neuroscientists and philosophers for an interdisciplinary discussion on the nature of representation in neuroscience.
\nKeynote Speakers:
\nProf. Konrad Kö\;rding\, University of Pennsylvania\; \;
\nProf. John Krakauer\, Johns Hopkins University
\nWorkshop Dates and Location:
\nMay 16-17\, 2025\, Rutgers University\, Newark.
\nFormat: Each submitted talk will be 30 minutes in length with 15 minutes Q&\;A. For possible inclusion on the program\, please submit a 500-word abstract to ken.aizawa@gmail.com by February 1\, 2025. Please use the subject line &ldquo\;Neural Representations Conference [Author Last Name].&rdquo\; Decisions will be made before March 1\, 2025.
ORGANIZER;CN=Ken Aizawa;CN=Ori Hacohen: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR