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DTSTAMP:20260604T000527Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20250227T000000
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SUMMARY:Blame\, Excuses\, and Responsibility
UID:20260604T054029Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Neuchâtel\, Switzerland
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>https://sites.google.com/view/neuchatelconference/home</strong></p>\n<p><strong></strong><strong>The Institute of Philosophy at the University of Neuch&acirc\;tel welcomes potential contributions from scholars at all career stages working on philosophical questions about blame\, excuses\, and responsibility. Questions that directly address or merely implicate the following and other points of inquiry concerning defenses are especially welcome:</strong></p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Under what conditions should someone be excused from moral wrongdoing\, and how are these conditions related to the putative conditions of responsibility?</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Why do specific defenses\, like self-defense and entrapment\, excuse responsibility or blame for wrongdoing\, and what normative limitations are there on these defenses?</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; How do concepts like self-defense\, mistake of fact\, duress\, entrapment\, and others connect or conflict within the landscape of defenses and responsibility? Is the difference just a matter of their physical\, mental\, or political elements? Or is there something more principled between these concepts that make them essentially different kinds of defenses?</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Do legal defenses offer insights into the moral concept of excusing\, and where do they align or diverge?</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Are there unique normative considerations in criminal and civil law regarding what it means to be excused\, and how might these shape our understanding of moral responsibility?</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; In what ways might forgiveness act as an exculpatory category\, and how does it differ from traditional defenses in moral and legal philosophy?</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; Are there any emerging defenses in the moral or legal domains that challenge traditional views of responsibility\, e.g.\, the &ldquo\;battered woman syndrome defense&rdquo\; in law.</p>\n<p>&bull\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; What are the implications of viewing defenses through the lens of collective responsibility or systemic issues?</p>\n<p>By <strong>February 27\, 2025</strong>\, please send abstracts (between 250-1000 words) in English to: no longer accepting submissions</p>\n<p><strong>Selected talks will then be communicated by March 7.</strong></p>\n<p>Any questions can be directed to the same address.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Sayid Bnefsi;CN=Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette;CN=Antoine Dang Van;CN="Patricia Sánchez Oliva":
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