BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260606T031518Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20140121T073000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20140121T083000 SUMMARY:Was Merleau-Ponty a 'transcendental' phenomenologist? UID:20260610T191049Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:Europe/London LOCATION:Malet Street\, London\, United Kingdom\, WC1 DESCRIPTION:

Whether or not Merleau-Ponty's version of phenomenology should be considered a form of 'transcendental' philosophy is open to debate. Although the Phenomenology of Perception presents his position as a transcendental one\, many of its features &ndash\; e.g. its exploitation of empirical science &ndash\; might lead to doubt that it can be. This paper argues that\, despite his own rhetoric\, Merleau-Ponty&rsquo\;s conception of phenomenology should not be considered transcendental. It begins by highlighting three features &ndash\; the absolute ego\, the pure phenomenal field\, and the reduction &ndash\; that Husserl had used to justify claims of a specifically transcendental kind within a phenomenological framework. I then consider how Merleau-Ponty modifies each feature to focus on the lived body and a factically conditioned phenomenal field\, while remaining ambivalent about the reduction. Although Merleau-Ponty interprets these changes as yielding a revised form of transcendental phenomenology\, I argue that his various revisions to Husserl&rsquo\;s position alter the modality of Merleau-Ponty&rsquo\;s claims in a way that undermines the supposed distinction between transcendental and empirical enquiry.

Admission Free. All welcome.

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