Considerations about the nature of welfare\, the value of welfare\, its distribution\, or welfare-based claims and complaints are central to moral philosophy. They are of particular concern for all philosophers who take welfare to be (at least) one source for normative reasons. Evaluative and deontic considerations about welfare provide an array of fascinating philosophical questions.
\nIt is (quite) uncontroversial that welfare has moral value and provides moral reasons\; but it is highly contested how in particular. We ought not to harm people\, but do we also ought to benefit them? Does this include future people &ndash\; even if their existence depends on our actions? And can we aggregate people&rsquo\;s welfare\, or should we limit the trade-offs between their harms and benefits?
\nOur account of welfare has implications for ethics\; but do ethical considerations also provide reasons to adopt one or another theory of welfare? What is the interaction between theories of welfare and the ethics of welfare? \;
\nSome lives are better and some are worse\; but what constitutes their prudential value? Are well-being and ill-being analogous or do they differ in structure and relevance &ndash\; and what do particular theories imply? What are the relevant underlying concepts of desire\, pleasure\, friendship\, or other objective goods on which welfare may depend?
\nThis workshop provides a forum for the discussion of those and related questions. It aims at rallying scholars of philosophy to expand our understanding in these issues\, and we hope to promote the philosophical engagement with ethics\, welfare\, and how they interact.
\nRegistration
\nIf you would like to attend\, please send an email to workshoponwelfare@gmail.com by 19 June. \;
\nSchedule
\nWednesday\, 2 July
\n11:00 &ndash\; 11:15 Welcome and Introduction \;
\n11:15 &ndash\; 12:00 \;Hasko von Kriegstein (Toronto Metropolitan University/Humboldt Foundation): \;The Prudential Value of Correspondence between Mind and World
\n12:30 &ndash\; 13:15 \;Mauro Rossi (Université\; du Qué\;bec à\; Montré\;al): \;Ill-Being and Fitting Unhappiness \;
\nLunchbreak \;
\n14:15 &ndash\; 15:00 \;Willem van der Deijl (Tilburg University): \;The good experience account of wellbeing \;
\n15:30 &ndash\; 16:15 \;Yuqi Liang (Oxford University): \;Peak Experiences \;
\n16:45 &ndash\; 18:15 \;Chris Heathwood (University of Colorado\, Boulder):Are Adaptive Preferences a Problem for Subjective Theories of Well-Being? \;
\n19:30 \;Dinner \; \;
\nThursday\, 3 July
\n10:00 &ndash\; 10:45 \;Luca Hemmerich (Goethe University Frankfurt): \;Three Accounts of Irreducibly Collective Interests \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;
\n11:15 &ndash\; 12:00 \;Luca Stroppa (University of Turin): \;Soritical Superiority \;
\n12:30 &ndash\; 13:15 \;Jonas Harney (TU Dortmund University): \;Prospects of Welfare Losses \;
\nLunchbreak \;
\n14:15 &ndash\; 15:00 \;Tomasz Żuradzki (Jagiellonian University Krakó\;w): \;Welfare and Identity: Beyond the Distinction Between Person-Affecting and Identity-Affecting Interventions \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \; \;
\n15:30 &ndash\; 17:00 \;Hilary Greaves (Oxford University): \;For goodness&rsquo\; sake \;
\n18:30 \;Dinner \;
\nAbstracts can be found on the workshop&rsquo\;s website.
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ORGANIZER;CN=Jonas Harney;CN=Hasko von Kriegstein;CN=Thorsten Helfer;CN=Maximilian Klein: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR