We&rsquo\;re thrilled to have our next \;Legislative Intent and Ordinary Meaning \;project speaker: \;Kevin Tobia \;(Georgetown) on Thursday\, February 13 at 12:30&ndash\;1:50 pm.
\nThe title of Kevin&rsquo\;s talk is: &ldquo\;Reading Law with Linguistics: The Statutory Interpretation of Artifact Nouns&rdquo\;. The full paper is available on SSRN.
\nThe abstract is as follows:
\nIs an airplane a &ldquo\;vehicle&rdquo\;? \;Is a floating home a &ldquo\;vessel&rdquo\;? Is an unassembled gun a &ldquo\;firearm&rdquo\;? Such questions about &ldquo\;artifact nouns&rdquo\;&mdash\;nouns that describe human-created entities&mdash\;are fodder for legal philosophy. They are also common statutory interpretation issues\, which today&rsquo\;s textualist courts resolve with linguistic analysis. We propose that textualist courts complement familiar tools\, like dictionaries\, with insights from linguistics.
\nWe examine as a case study Garland v. VanDerStok\, which the Supreme Court will soon decide. It concerns &ldquo\;gun parts kits\,&rdquo\; firearm parts that can become operable firearms through combination or part finishing. These kits have been used in several mass shootings\, and the case concerns whether such a kit is a &ldquo\;firearm&rdquo\; subject to regulation under the 1968 Gun Control Act. To analyze the statute&rsquo\;s meaning\, we apply insights from linguistic theory\, new data from language usage\, and a survey study of ordinary Americans. This evidence supports that the gun parts kits identified by the government fit within the statutory meaning of &ldquo\;firearm.&rdquo\;
\nThe article&rsquo\;s case study in the legal interpretation of artifact nouns also carries broader implications. We develop lessons for the practice of legal interpretation\, statutory interpretation theory\, and broader debates in legal philosophy.
ORGANIZER;CN=Manish Oza;CN=Andy Yu: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR