In 2004\, David Levy published \;Love and Sex with Robots\, in which he outlines a utopian future where humans will opt to pursue sexual and even marital relationships with robots. Robots\, Levy contends\, will serve as &lsquo\;perfect lovers&rsquo\;: they are not demanding\, they can be tailored to meet the needs of their users\, and they are reliable. Pushing back against Levy&rsquo\;s fanciful visions\, though\, many commentators &ndash\; including social theorist Sherry Turkle\, anthropologist Kathleen Richardson\, and theologian Noreen Herzfeld &ndash\; have critiqued the idea of perfect robotic lovers as a contradiction in terms. For Turkle\, love with robots is misleadingly \;uni-directional\; for Richardson\, who leads the &lsquo\;Campaign Against Sex Robots&rsquo\;\, sex with robots facilitates misogynistic attitudes and behaviours\; and for Herzfeld\, any kind of partnership with robots lacks the completeness of full human pairings with another person. Across these examples and elsewhere\, we find that perfect love doesn&rsquo\;t make sense without reciprocity\, emotion\, and understanding &ndash\; all of these are things that robots\, at least at present\, lack. So what does human\, robotic\, and so-called perfect love entail? In this \;paper\, I consider these questions by exploring different attitudes to love that span philosophy\, psychology\, and now also robotics (in a field that is termed &lsquo\;lovotics&rsquo\;). How do these themes relate to theological ideas about love\, and in particular\, notions of perfect love? And what critiques can be raised from theology? This \;paper \;sets out a discussion between philosophy\, theology\, and \;lovotics \;as we grapple with the meaning and trajectory of our affections and desires in our current and future technocultural contexts\, with a view to developing a posthumanist understanding of love.
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