Abstract:
\nHistorically\, dynamic theories of time have held there is no time without
change. This change is not merely &lsquo\;McTaggart&rsquo\; change - change in temporal
properties\, say from future to present - but continuous\, pervasive change
in the material world. However\, at some point in the seventeenth century\,
this view shifted\, and time became disconnected from change. This paper
investigates that shift\, and argues that it concurs with the emergence of
&lsquo\;substantivalism&rsquo\;\, the view that time is a quasi-substance that flows
independently of its contents. Through an examination of some of the
earliest substantivalists\, including the English thinkers Henry More and
Newton\, I argue that substantivalism developed in reaction to various
cosmological and metaphysical pressures. These include the dissolution of
the Aristotelian worldview\, on which time is identified with the motion of
the celestial spheres\, and Cartesian vortex theory. Further\, I suggest
that the development of substantivalism laid the groundwork for the next
&lsquo\;revolution&rsquo\; in the philosophy of time: the development of static theories
of time.