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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260606T205142Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20250404T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20250404T173000
SUMMARY:ECOM Speaker Series: Matthew Chrisman
UID:20260613T105551Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION:University of Connecticut\, Storrs\, United States\, 06269
DESCRIPTION:<p>ECOM is delighted to host Prof. Matthew Christman! He will present a talk titled &ldquo\;Transparency and Sociality of Belief&rdquo\;.&nbsp\;<br>(The talk will be in hybrid format\, the Zoom link will be shared a day before the talk.)</p>\n<p><strong>&ldquo\;Transparency and Sociality of Belief&rdquo\;</strong></p>\n<p>Abstract: A prominent view holds that our beliefs are transparent\, in the sense that one should\, and normally will\, answer the question &ldquo\;Do you believe&nbsp\;<em>p</em>?&rdquo\; by seeking to settle the corresponding question about whether&nbsp\;<em>p</em>. Transparency is held to be a normative requirement and also crucial to understanding the distinctively authoritative and secure nature of knowledge of one&rsquo\;s own beliefs. In this paper\, we argue that the transparency requirement\, as well as our authoritative and secure self-knowledge of our beliefs\, should be explained by something else: the social role belief. We hold that to believe&nbsp\;<em>p</em>&nbsp\;transparently is to be prepared to contribute&nbsp\;<em>p</em>&nbsp\;to shared reasoning with others\, and to self-ascribe the belief that&nbsp\;<em>p</em>&nbsp\;transparently is to make explicit that one would contribute&nbsp\;<em>p</em>&nbsp\;to shared reasoning. We conclude that understanding our normative epistemic relationships to other people is fundamental to explaining distinctive features of knowledge of our own beliefs.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Utku Sonsayar;CN=Dorit Bar-On:
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