BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260416T055109Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20250404T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20250404T200000
SUMMARY:ALEF Seminar Brains in vats and semantic externalism: a new argument against the skeptical challenge
UID:20260419T085148Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract:</strong> It has been argued that since we cannot rule out that we are eternal brains in vats (BIVs) whose sensory impressions are generated by a supercomputer\, most (or almost all) of our empirical beliefs are such that we cannot rule out that they are false. Since fallible knowledge seems to be a contradiction in terms\, it has been concluded that we have much less empirical knowledge than we would normally assume. This is the skeptical argument. Starting from semantic externalism\, various arguments have been proposed to rule out the possibility that we are BIVs. In this paper\, I will argue that trying to rule out the possibility of being a BIV is a very weak response to the skeptical argument\, as it accepts the challenge raised by the skeptic. In fact\, we will see that starting from semantic externalism a much stronger response is possible. Accordingly\, we do not have to rule out that we are BIVs in order for the skeptical argument to contain a false premise.</p>\n<p><strong>Zoom</strong>: <a href="https://us02web.zoom.us/j/83691371602?pwd=Ym1tQWhIWTlTbDJ4YmNwNFRRaFBIZz09">https://us02web.zoom.us/j/83691371602?pwd=Ym1tQWhIWTlTbDJ4YmNwNFRRaFBIZz09</a></p>\n<p>Meeting ID: 836 9137 1602</p>\n<p>Passcode: 097096</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Paula Tomi;CN=Mihai Rusu;CN=Adrian Ludusan:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR