Abstract: \;The Lockean view of temporal experiences (or snapshot theory) insists that\, strictly speaking\, we don&rsquo\;t really perceive the temporal properties of events (such as their succession\, order\, change\, etc.). Instead\, we just have successive snapshots of temporal parts of events\, and that is all. The Lockean view is hence guilty of violating an important piece of phenomenological common sense&mdash\;namely\, that we clearly seem to see motion\, change\, succession\, etc. To defuse such guilt\, the Lockean will turn projectivist\, arguing that\, strictly speaking\, we make a phenomenological or introspective mistake when we think the phenomenology of our experiences shows that we can experience motion\, change\, succession\, etc. The question is what explains this systematic mistake. The paper suggests that the transparency of experience is to blame.
\nAll welcome!
\nNote: there is also a zoom option for this talk using the link below. If you are planning on attending online please just email the organiser (Yuri Cath )to let us know that.
\n