The goal of this workshop is to bring together philosophers working in moral psychology\, ethics\, and the theory of agency &\; responsibility to discuss questions like those below.
\nOne way of being responsible for an action is being praiseworthy for it. But what is the &ldquo\;praise&rdquo\; of which the praiseworthy agent is worthy? This is a question about praise&rsquo\;s nature. More determinate questions concerning the nature of praise include: Is praise fundamentally affective? If so\, what are the emotions of praise? What is the relationship between judging praiseworthy and praising? Can one praise privately? Does praise&mdash\;perhaps only when expressed\, assuming we \;can \;praise privately&mdash\; characteristically benefit the praisee? What is self-praise? (Should it be identified with (a kind of) pride?) Do the objects of praise (e.g. actions\, perhaps traits of character\, perhaps certain attitudes) differ interestingly from the objects of blame? Does the difference between moral praise and non-moral (e.g. epistemic\, aesthetic\, athletic) praise reside only in a difference in their contents (what the praise is about)? \;
\;
Next\, what are the norms governing praise? More determinate questions concerning praise&rsquo\;s norms: When an agent is praiseworthy for something\, what does her being \;worthy of \;praise consist in? Does it consist in part in (or entail) a reason in favor of praising her? Is this a reason of justice? Owing to one&rsquo\;s being praiseworthy\, is it non-instrumentally good that she receive the praise of which she&rsquo\;s worthy? Can agents legitimately demand (or perhaps request?) praise in virtue of being praiseworthy (or can others do so on their behalf)? Does an agent&rsquo\;s being praiseworthy at one time entail their being praiseworthy (for the same thing and to the same degree) at some later time? What norms should be included in a &lsquo\;morality of praise&rsquo\;? \;