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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20261002T055039Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20140327T121500
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20140327T141500
SUMMARY:Chancy Goods and Well-Being Pluralism
UID:20261002T210405Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:dca3:70ff:fede:dbf7%3
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Parkville Campus\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3010
DESCRIPTION:<p>In this paper I argue for 'Chancy Goods'\, the view that an individual<br>X's increased chance of receiving a good G is good for X whether or<br>not X receives G.&nbsp\; Chancy Goods offers a more plausible view of the<br>value of chances of benefiting than rival views because it offers a<br>better account of our intuitive judgments regarding a range of<br>probabilistic cases.&nbsp\; After clarifying the kind of counterfactual<br>chance relevant for Chancy Goods\, I then argue that on a number of<br>prominent accounts of well-being\, the value of Chancy Goods cannot be<br>explained entirely instrumentally.&nbsp\; As a result\, Chancy Goods can be<br>used to support the view that human well-being consists of more than<br>one type of non-instrumental good ('Well-Being Pluralism').&nbsp\; Finally\,<br>I consider whether there's a value asymmetry for risks of harms by<br>asking whether or not an individual X's increased chance of suffering<br>a harm H is bad for X whether or not X suffers H.<br><br></p>
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