Abstract: \;What distinguishes a mere true belief from genuine knowledge? A multitude of answers have been given to this question\, but almost all of them share a key feature in common\, namely\, that the further conditions one must meet to possess knowledge are \;&lsquo\;upstream&rsquo\; conditions to do with the causal and/or rational origins of one&rsquo\;s belief state (e.g.\, that it was the output of a reliable belief forming process\, or that it was not subject to Gettier-style luck\, or that it was based on good evidence). Alternatively\, in this talk I will develop a view according to which the conditions that distinguish mere true belief from knowledge are &lsquo\;downstream conditions&rsquo\; to do with whether one&rsquo\;s true belief entails the possession of relevant dispositional states and abilities. The motivation for this approach comes from reflecting on debates about forms of knowledge and understanding&mdash\;especially\, practical knowledge (&lsquo\;knowing-how&rsquo\;)\, understanding (esp. &lsquo\;understanding-why&rsquo\;)\, and experiential knowledge (&lsquo\;knowing what it is like&rsquo\;)&mdash\;that are often thought to be irreducible to propositional knowledge (&lsquo\;knowing-that&rsquo\;). I will show how we can offer an attractive account both of what differentiates \;and \;what unifies these different forms of knowledge/understanding\, by viewing them all as distinct species of downstream knowledge. I will also argue that various distinctions made between these different forms of knowledge/understanding on the one hand\, versus knowing-that on the other\, are best recast in terms of a distinction between downstream versus upstream knowledge.
\n\nJoin Zoom meeting:
\nhttps://monash.zoom.us/j/86351045263?pwd=1gHMLhmDnXiFJIV0Jl8s6GxhgBgylb.1 \;
\nMeeting ID: 863 5104 5263 // Passcode: 184791
ORGANIZER;CN=Sandra Leonie Field: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR