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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260609T023504Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20140313T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20140313T100000
SUMMARY:Logics and Theories of Consequence
UID:20260609T201930Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Senate House\, London\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>Thurs 13 Mar\, 12.30pm IPLunchtime Seminar: Room 243\, Senate House\, Malet Street\, WC1</p>\n<p>Logics and Theories of Consequence<br> John Wigglesworth(IP &amp\; LSE)</p>\n<p><br> Abstract:<br> A logic can be understood as a theory of consequence.&nbsp\; A logic tells us what follows from what.&nbsp\; Different logics give us different theories about what follows from what.&nbsp\; For example\, classical logic says that P follows from ~~P\, while intuitionist logic denies this.&nbsp\; These two theories disagree about what follows from what\, and so they give different theories of consequence.&nbsp\; We look at the idea of logics as theories of consequence from the perspective of the philosophy of science.&nbsp\; The literature on scientific theories is split roughly into two camps: syntactic accounts and semantic accounts.&nbsp\; Any account of scientific theory one chooses should provide us with identity conditions on theories\, telling us when two theories are the same.&nbsp\; We show that both syntactic accounts and semantic accounts give inadequate identity conditions for logics as theories of consequence.<br> <br> Admission Free. All welcome.</p>
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