BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260620T063347Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250730T154500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20250730T171500
SUMMARY:Bayes and Brentano
UID:20260621T143913Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Carl-Friedrich-von-Siemens Foundation\, Südliches Schlossrondell 23\, Germany\, 80638
DESCRIPTION:<p>When evidence E is acquired\, pr(E) rises to 1.&nbsp\; What about its truth-makers' probabilities&nbsp\; pr(&epsilon\;)? These will have to change too\, as E's probability is a function of theirs.&nbsp\; Bayes' rule&nbsp\; is strangely uncurious about this\; it doesn't ask about the probabilistic underpinnings of E's newfound certainty.&nbsp\; What possible excuse can it have\,&nbsp\; when&nbsp\; E's bearing on H&nbsp\; depends&nbsp\; on the relative probabilities of&nbsp\; pro-H truth-makers and anti-H?.&nbsp\; The explanation (it's not an excuse) is that &epsilon\; for the Bayesian trails along probabilistically after E.&nbsp\; A rule allowing&nbsp\; E to trail along&nbsp\; after its truth-makers is proposed.&nbsp\; All heck breaks loose\, e.g.\, evidential relations&nbsp\; become hyperintensional.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Mark Jago;CN=Lucas Champollion;CN=Erica Shumener;CN="Martín Abreu Zavaleta";CN=Kit Fine;CN=Justin Bledin:
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