Logicians use \;analyticity \;in different meanings\, some of them think of it as a \;semantic \;property of true sentences\; they either think of analytic truths as &lsquo\;truths in virtue of meaning&rsquo\; or as &lsquo\;truth in virtue of meaning of logical words&rsquo\;. Let us call the first understanding of analyticity \;the wider \;notion of analyticity and the second one \;the \;narrower \;notion of it since restricts analyticity to be true in virtue of a specific kind of words.
\nSome other logicians understand analyticity \;syntactically\, that is \;literally in terms of syntax and structure of expressions. They prefer to call logical systems with sabformula property as &lsquo\;analytic&rsquo\;. One known system with this property is Gentzen&rsquo\;s Sequent Calculus. Since the semantic account of analyticity is silent about the literal composition of an expression out of its elements\, sabformula property is not necessary for a logical system to be analytic. Natural Deduction is a well-known system without Sab-Formula property.
\nI will study the possible relation between the semantic/syntactic notions of analyticity by way of a conjecture: if we think of the meaning of logical vocabulary as their role in an argument\, then syntactic issues are significant in characterizing the meaning of them. This conjecture\, I think\, has a support. \; \;By the normalization theorem\, Prawitz has shown that any proof in Natural Deduction system can be transformed into a normal proof. This happens because the Conditional Elimination rule in a Natural Deduction system offers a different meaning for the conditional\, when compared with the left-rule for the conditional in the Sequent Calculus.
\n\n\n ORGANIZER;CN=Tristram Oliver-Skuse: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR