There is a longstanding tradition of thinking of acquaintance as a way of being cognitively related to what cannot be described\, conveyed or expressed. (James\, 1890: 221\; von Helmholtz\, 1868: 308&ndash\;9\; Russell\, 1903: v\; perhaps also Leibniz\, 1682-4: 285\; Kant\, 1992: 105&ndash\;6\, 466\, 569&ndash\;70\; cf. 1787: B14&ndash\;5.)
\nHowever\, in more recent philosophy\, where acquaintance has been discussed in relation to singular thought and reference\, mental content\, perception and foundationalist epistemology (e.g. Evans\, 1982\; McDowell\, 1998\; \;Fumerton\, 1995\; \; Campbell\, 2002\; Knowles &\; Raleigh\, 2019) there has been something of a de-centring of the topic of the ineffable. The notable exception is\, of course\, Jackson&rsquo\;s &lsquo\;Knowledge Argument&rsquo\; and responses to it invoking &lsquo\;phenomenal properties&rsquo\; or qualia with which we can be acquainted\; but even here\, it is rare for philosophers to enter into any sustained discussion of what it might mean to say that what Mary learns when she leaves her black-and-white room is 'ineffable'. \;
\nOutside of the philosophy of mind\, there has been some recent work on the relationship between ineffability and acquaintance. For example\, A.W. Moore has suggested that ineffable knowledge might best be conceived as non-propositional knowledge. In his work\, he takes this non-propositional knowledge to be knowledge-how or a kind of practical understanding\; but others (e.g. Jonas 2016: chs. 6 &\; 7) have suggested that it might be better to think of it as knowledge-of\, i.e. acquaintance. However\, as things stand\, this possibility remains relatively under-explored.
\nThe aim of this workshop\, then\, is to focus on the relationship between ineffability and acquaintance. We are pleased to welcome an international lineup of speakers\, from France\, Germandy\, India\, Sweden and the UK. The draft schedule for the event is as follows (venue and joining informatio will be shared with registered participants in early January): \;
\nThursday 8th \;January
\n11am &ndash\; 12.15pm Keynote: Silvia Jonas\, &lsquo\;Ineffable Understanding as Acquaintance&rsquo\;
\n12.20 &ndash\; 1.35pm Ake Gafvelin\, &lsquo\;Quasi-Realism and Mysticism&rsquo\;
\n1.35 &ndash\; 2.30pm Lunch
\n2.30 &ndash\; 3.45pm Elias Cohen\, &lsquo\;Intentionality Without Expressibility&rsquo\;
\n3.50 &ndash\; 5.05pm Francesco Gandellini\, &lsquo\;The &ldquo\;Great Allure&rdquo\; of Transcendental Idealism:
\nAdrian Moore&rsquo\;s Proposal Between Ineffability and Nonsense&rsquo\;
\nDrinks/Dinner
\nFriday 9th \;January
\n9 &ndash\; 10.15am Karim Shoaib\, &lsquo\;Acquaintance and Direct Reference in Ismāʿīlī Apophaticism&rsquo\;
\n10.20 &ndash\; 11.35am Cara Addleman\, &lsquo\;Down on My Knees: Ineffable Content and Practice-Based Belief in Faith and Love&rsquo\;
\n11.35 &ndash\; 11.55am Break
\n11.55am &ndash\; 1.10pm Iain Haslam\, &lsquo\;Acquaintance with Value: Ineffable Understanding and the Grasp of Moral Concepts&rsquo\;
\n1.10 &ndash\; 2pm Lunch
\n2 &ndash\; 3.15pm Poonam\, &lsquo\;The Ineffable Divine: Acquaintance\, Experience\, and the Limits of Knowing&rsquo\;
\n3.20 &ndash\; 4.35pm Keynote: Adrian Haddock\, &lsquo\;Experience and the Ineffable&rsquo\;
\nClose
ORGANIZER;CN=Christopher Jay;CN=Robert Trueman;CN=Owen Hulatt: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR