BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260607T202436Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20120126T180000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20120126T180000 SUMMARY:Traditional compatibilism revisited UID:20260616T160739Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:Europe/Berlin LOCATION:Universitätstr.\, Essen\, Germany\, 45117 DESCRIPTION:

Abstract

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According to traditional \ncompatibilism (about free will)\, the ability to do otherwise can be \nanalysed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. This is known as the \nconditional analysis. It is widely believed\, even among compatibilists\, \nthat traditional compatibilism is a dead horse\, as it were. One of the \nmain reasons for this is that the conditional analysis is thought to be \nsubject to decisive counterexamples. In this paper\, I will defend \ntraditional compatibilism against this objection. I will propose a \nrevised version of the conditional analysis that preserves the core of \ntraditional compatibilism\, and I will argue that this account avoids the\n counterexamples. Further\, I will explain how compatibilists can use the\n conditional analysis in order to respond to the consequence argument \nfor incompatibilism (van Inwagen 1983).


References

van Inwagen\, P. (1983)\, An Essay on Free Will. Oxford UP.

ORGANIZER;CN=Ezio Di Nucci: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR