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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260430T232943Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20250925T161500
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20250925T181500
SUMMARY:A Chancy Theory of Counterfactuals
UID:20260502T133431Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Arts West\, West Wing\, Melbourne\, Australia
DESCRIPTION:<p>Abstract: I have long argued against the Stalnaker/Lewis &lsquo\;similarity&rsquo\; accounts of counterfactuals. Roughly\, they say that the counterfactual</p>\n<p><em>if p were the case\, q would be the case&nbsp\;</em></p>\n<p>is true<em>&nbsp\;</em>if and only if</p>\n<p><em>at the most similar p-worlds\, q is true</em>.</p>\n<p>Most philosophers agree with this. I disagree. I will summarise my main arguments against this entire approach and add some new ones.</p>\n<p>I will offer a paradigm shift based on conditional chances. The counterfactual is true iff the chance of&nbsp\;<em>q</em>\, given&nbsp\;<em>p</em>\, equals 1&nbsp\;at a time shortly\, but not too shortly\, before the truth value of&nbsp\;<em>p&nbsp\;</em>was settled.&nbsp\;I will argue that this account has many advantages over the similarity accounts.</p>\n<p>What are the chances? I will present my version of a propensity account\, and I will argue that it avoids the main objections that have been levelled against propensities. In short\, I offer a conditional propensity account of counterfactuals.</p>
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