BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260403T232840Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251010T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251010T153000
SUMMARY:Philosophy of Science of Decision Making - Camilla Colombo (Oct 10)
UID:20260404T011141Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-4s97k
TZID:Europe/London
DESCRIPTION:<p>I'm excited to invite you to the third installment of the&nbsp\;<em>Philosophy of Science of Decision Making</em>&nbsp\;seminar series. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>S</strong><strong>peaker:</strong>&nbsp\;Camilla Colombo (RWTH Aachen University) &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Title:</strong>&nbsp\;"Choice automation as choice deferral: rationality and autonomy" &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Date:&nbsp\;</strong>10&nbsp\;October 2025\, 14:00 (CEST)</p>\n<p><strong>Format:&nbsp\;</strong>Online\, in English &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Abstract:</strong>&nbsp\;&ldquo\;Choice deferral&rdquo\; is a weird beast: this umbrella term has been used in the decision theory literature to cover a wide variety of choice behaviours\, from procrastination to delegation and\, more recently\, choice automation. In this talk\, I first discuss how choice deferral can prove difficult to conceptualize and to model in standard decision theory settings\; I then argue that different cases and patterns of deferral can be addressed as specific instances of choice delegation. In the second part of this talk\, we will survey which could be the grounds for reasonable choice delegation: that is\, when it is normatively rational to delegate your choice to your future self\, to another human\, to &ldquo\;Nature&rdquo\;\, or to a technology. This discussion highlights that the rational justifications for choice deferral\, from cognitive offloading to consistency\, are far from univocal\, and are often motivated by opposite desiderata and goals in our decision-making practices. I conclude that an unitary justification for rational choice deferral cannot be provided\, but that different purposes and instances of choice delegation\, such as automation\, would require a rich and nuanced understanding of its motivations\, if we strive to model normatively sound criteria for choice deferral. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Registration:&nbsp\;</strong>If you would like to join this seminar and have not previously registered\, please send an email to&nbsp\;<u>james.grayot@gmail.com</u>&nbsp\;with the subject line "PhilSciDec". Video links will be shared only with those who register at least 24 hrs in advance of the seminar.</p>\n<p><strong>Info:</strong>&nbsp\;For more information about the seminar series\, including future speakers and topics\, please visit the website below.&nbsp\; &nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=James Grayot:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR