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DTSTAMP:20260415T185534Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20251107T160000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20251107T173000
SUMMARY:Philosophy of science of decision making - Aliya Rumana (Nov 7)
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DESCRIPTION:<p>You're cordially invited to the fifth installment of the&nbsp\;<em>Philosophy of Science of Decision Making</em>&nbsp\;seminar series.&nbsp\; &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Speaker:</strong>&nbsp\;Aliya Rumana (University of Texas\, El Paso) &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Title:</strong>&nbsp\;"Norm arbitration as a problem for functional analysis" &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>Date:&nbsp\;</strong>7&nbsp\;November 2025\,&nbsp\;16:00 (CET / GMT+1)</p>\n<p><strong>Format:&nbsp\;</strong>Online\, in English &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Abstract:&nbsp\;</strong>Most studies in the psychology of judgment and decision-making (JDM) administer tasks\, which participants can perform correctly or incorrectly. Since the 1960s and '70s\, there has been significant disagreement about how to evaluate participant responses to tasks as correct or incorrect. Prima facie\, this is a surprising state-of-affairs: JDM psychology aims to explain human JDM\, so how has it come to be entrenched in disagreements about how to evaluate human JDM? Many think explanation and evaluation are separable activities\, and disagree about whether JDM psychology may do both (e.g.\, Stanovich\, 2011) or ought to leave evaluation to philosophy (e.g.\, Elqayam &amp\; Evans\, 2011). In this paper\, I argue that objectivism about evaluation (the view that normative properties instantiate independently of our normative commitments) implies that evaluation is partly constitutive of explanation. In particular\, it implies a more sophisticated conception of functional analysis\, compared to the standard account by Cummins (1983). I won't defend objectivism about evaluation\, of course\, but I'll argue that it provides a way to explain why JDM psychologists try so vigorously to resolve evaluative disagreements: if they are objectivists about evaluation\, then they need to resolve evaluative disagreements in order to resolve explanatory ones. &nbsp\; <br> &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Registration:&nbsp\;</strong>If you would like to join this seminar and have not previously registered\, please send an email to&nbsp\;<u>james.grayot@gmail.com</u>&nbsp\;with the subject line "PhilSciDec". Video links will be shared only with those who register at least 24 hrs in advance of the seminar.</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong> <strong>Info:</strong>&nbsp\;For more information about the seminar series\, including future speakers and topics\, please visit the website&nbsp\;listed below.&nbsp\; &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Best\,&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>James Grayot &nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=James Grayot:
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