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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260607T070628Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20140506T140000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20140506T150000
SUMMARY:Emotions: Feeling and Intentionality. 
UID:20260614T153123Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:University of Melbourne\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3010
DESCRIPTION:<p>Christine Tappolet and Sabine D&ouml\;ring claim that emotions have representational content that can figure in justifications. Explaining how this could be so is a live philosophical task. I examine two very different pictures of how emotions get to have representational contents and argue that both fail to give perceptual theorists the resources they need for their account of emotions.&nbsp\;</p>\n&nbsp\;\nI then examine what lesson to learn from the two failures about how to build a theory that will satisfy the demands of a perceptual theory\, and argue that the right lesson to learn is that such a theory should treat emotional feelings as intrinsically intentional. Finally I give some reasons to think that this is not a strange conclusion.
ORGANIZER;CN=Tristram Oliver-Skuse:
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