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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260311T123502Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20260203T120000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20260203T133000
SUMMARY:Mark Risjord - Due Diligence and Epistemic Caution: An Impartial Account of Inductive Risk
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TZID:America/New_York
LOCATION: University of Pittsburgh\, 4200 Fifth Avenue\, Pittsburgh\, United States\, 15260
DESCRIPTION:<p>The Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh invites you to join us for our Lunch Time Talk.&nbsp\;Attend in person at 1117 Cathedral of Learning or visit our live stream on YouTube at&nbsp\;<a rel="noopenerdata-cke-saved-href=">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg</a>.</p>\n<p><strong>LTT:&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;<a data-cke-saved-href="https://www.centerphilsci.pitt.edu/fellows/risjord-mark/">Mark Risjord</a></strong></p>\n<p>Tuesday\, February 3rd @ 12:00 pm&nbsp\;-&nbsp\;1:30 pm&nbsp\;EST</p>\n<p><strong>Title:</strong> <strong>Due</strong>&nbsp\;<strong>Diligence and Epistemic Caution: An Impartial Account of Inductive Risk</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Abstract:</strong></p>\n<p>The gap argument from inductive risk asserts that the uncertainty of induction entails that scientists must decide or choose whether to accept an inductive conclusion as true\, and such decisions ought to take into account the costs of error.&nbsp\; This chapter argues that the gap argument is sound only if one makes substantial assumptions about the epistemology of inductive inference.&nbsp\; These assumptions are tendentious and have been rejected by many gap-free accounts of induction.&nbsp\; Using the HUD audit study of racial discrimination in the housing market as a case study\, and combining Norton&rsquo\;s material theory of induction with Longino&rsquo\;s social epistemology and the epistemic principle of Inquisitive Due Diligence proposed by Khalifa\, Millson\, and Risjord\, this chapter will sketch a gap-free account of induction.&nbsp\; This account throws new light onto the phenomenon of inductive risk\, showing how scientific inquiry can (and should) be epistemically cautious when the stakes are high without giving up impartiality.</p>\n<p>This talk will be available online:</p>\n<p>Zoom:&nbsp\;&nbsp\;<a data-cke-saved-href="https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93939687549">&nbsp\;https://pitt.zoom.us/j/93939687549</a></p>\n<p><br>YouTube:&nbsp\;<a data-cke-saved-href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrRp47ZMXD7NXO3a9Gyh2sg</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Edouard Machery:
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