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DTSTAMP:20260428T020938Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20140514T050000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Amsterdam:20140514T130000
SUMMARY:The Significance of Phenomenology 
UID:20260502T171844Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Europe/Amsterdam
LOCATION:Amsterdam\, Netherlands
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>The Significance of Phenomenology</strong>&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Department of Philosophy\, University of Amsterdam</p>\n<p>Netherlands Institute for Cultural Analysis&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Institute for Logic\, Language and Computation</p>\n\n\n<p><strong>Wednesday 14 May\, 11.00-15.30\, </strong><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n<p>Location: Belle van Zuylenzaal\, Universiteitsbibliotheek\, Singel 425</p>\n<p><a target="_blank">http://cf.uba.uva.nl/nl/rondleiding/</a></p>\n<p><strong>&nbsp\;</strong></p>\n\n<p><strong>Workshop: Tim Crane&rsquo\;s <em>The Objects of Thought</em> </strong></p>\n<p>Crane&rsquo\;s <em>The Objects of Thought </em>&nbsp\;takes as its starting part the truism that some of the objects we can think about do not exist. This truism however raises a number of ontological puzzles. What is it that we are thinking about when we think about entities that do not exist? Crane defends two seemingly incompatible claims. On the one hand\, he argues that reality contains only what exists\, and since non-existent entities do not exist\, there is no room in reality for non-existents. Crane also argues that we can make true claims about entities that do not exist &ndash\; we can correctly predicate properties of non-existent entities like Pegasus and Sherlock Holmes. The remainder of the book consists of characteristically careful argument demonstrating how one can\, and indeed should\, hold both these claims. &nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>\n\n<p><strong>Speakers</strong></p>\n<p>Franz Berto </p>\n<p>Arianna Betti </p>\n<p>Julian Kiverstein </p>\n<p>Christian Skirke </p>\n<p>plus presentations from graduate students </p>\n\n<p>The workshop will be followed by a lecture from Prof Crane titled:</p>\n\n<p><strong>Intentional Identity Revisited</strong></p>\n\n<p>ABSTRACT</p>\n<p>We often think about things that don't exist\, and we seem to make judgements about the sameness and difference of such non-existent objects (Hermes is the same mythical god as Mercury). But what does it mean to say that one non-existent object is the same as another? This question was posed by PT Geach many years ago under the label 'intentional identity'. In this talk I argue that there is not really such a thing as intentional identity\, but nonetheless it is true that non-existent intentional objects can be the same as\, or different from\, other non-existent objects.</p>\n\n<p><strong>16.00-18.00</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Doelenzaal\, </strong><strong>Universiteitsbibliotheek\, Singel 425</strong></p>
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