Franz Brentano famously held that offering an analysis of the mind is essentially a matter of describing mental phenomena or\; \;mental appearances. But what does that mean? In this paper\, I \;review three alternative ways of understanding phenomena or appearances\, namely \;(1) phenomena as observable facts (Comte)\, (2) phenomena as &lsquo\;mere appearances&rsquo\; (Kant)\, and (3) the idea of a &lsquo\;veil of appearances&rsquo\; between you and the world (Locke). \;I argue\, first\, that Brentano&rsquo\;s notion of appearances does not commit him to \;any \;of these three views\, and second\, \;that for him the word &lsquo\;appearance&rsquo\; \;(Erscheinung) \;simply \;refers to the fact that something appears a certain way (to someone). I call this type of fact a \;phenomenological fact. So\, just as ordinary perceptual reports such as &lsquo\;the sky looks blue&rsquo\; and &lsquo\;the coffee is cold&rsquo\; capture phenomenological facts\, psychological reports such as &lsquo\;I hear the cat meowing behind the door&rsquo\; and &lsquo\;I hope Mary will come to the party&rsquo\; capture phenomenological facts\, too. More pointedly\, they capture \;ways you appear to yourself \;as a mentally active subject.
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