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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260417T043256Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20140527T181500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20140527T201500
SUMMARY:How to Believe a Conditional
UID:20260424T025330Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-x5n6c
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:London\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>Tues&nbsp\;27 May\, 5.15pm Room 243\, second floor\, Senate House\, WC1<br>Hugh Mellor&nbsp\;(Cambridge)</p>\n<p><br>How to Believe a Conditional</p>\n<p><br>Abstract: We defend the theory that to believe 'If P\, Q' is to be disposed to infer Q from P. We present this as an extension of the functionalism that defines beliefs by (a) their perceptual causes\, (b) the actions they combine with desires to cause\, and (c) their interactions with each other and with desires.&nbsp\;We show how this theory distinguishes material from hypothetical conditionals\, and explains how\, for the latter\, 'if P\, Q' can be true and 'If not-Q\, not-P' false.&nbsp\;We conclude by using the theory's account of believing that all Fs are G's - as being disposed to believe of any F that it's G - to account for the belief that there are some Fs (that are G).'</p>\n<br>\nFree entrance. Anyone wishing to join both speakers for a drink after the talk\, please let Maruricio Suarez know on: <a  href="mailto:mauricio.suarez@sas.ac.uk"  target="_blank">mauricio.suarez@sas.ac.uk</a>\n<br>
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