I critically examine the relationship between attentional templates\, mental imagery\, and perceptual processes. I argue that perceptualism\, according to which mental imagery is either a kind of perceptual state or a representation of a perceptual state\, is false. I introduce the so-called Rigid Argument\, which holds that the content of attentional templates and mental imagery is partly rigid\, whereas perceptual content is not. I contend that imaginative content refers to the same imaginative objects across possible worlds\, independent of actual perceptual input\, while perceptual representations are context-dependent and non-rigid. This distinction challenges the core assumption of perceptualist accounts and suggests that attentional templates and mental imagery cannot be subsumed under perceptual theories.
\nPiotr Kozak
\nZoom link : \;https://pantheonsorbonne.zoom.us/j/92782580594?pwd=a5p3WfunQQxJICrjJaUenFJFzmllbx.1