In his influential Third Logical Investigation\, Husserl employs a generic notion of &lsquo\;part&rsquo\;\, which has been criticised as merely analogical or metaphorical. Husserl distinguishes between &lsquo\;pieces&rsquo\;\, which are parts of a whole that can become independent existents\, from &lsquo\;moments&rsquo\; or &lsquo\;abstract parts&rsquo\;\, which cannot. This is evocative of Brentano&rsquo\;s distinction between parts that are separable from a whole and &lsquo\;parts&rsquo\; that are merely &lsquo\;distinctional&rsquo\;\, i.e. capable of being distinguished in the whole. However\, in Brentano\, the latter notion does not figure in the context of a philosophical mereology. At the time of his Wü\;rzburg lectures on metaphysics\, he refers to categories like substance\, quality\, or quantity as &lsquo\;metaphysical parts&rsquo\; of the subject. A relational property\, e.g. to be tall (one of Brentano&rsquo\;s examples)\, is also a category and thus a distinguishable metaphysical part. To be tall is evidently not a part of the subject in any literal sense. In Husserl\, by contrast\, the distinction between parts that are pieces and parts that are abstract moments is drawn within a mereological investigation. Peter Simons\, one of those who criticise Husserl&rsquo\;s generic notion of &lsquo\;parts&rsquo\;\, rejects this. Parts and properties\, he insists\, are fundamentally different things. Yet\, Simons believes that Husserl&rsquo\;s moments are particulars\, which I find difficult to defend as a philosophical position and an interpretation of Husserl. Husserl is admittedly ambivalent or unclear as to whether &lsquo\;property instances&rsquo\; (Simons) are particulars. In the Second Logical Investigation\, §\;41\, he explains that abstract contents are non-independent and that colour is an example of an abstract\, not a concrete\, content. The fact that he talks about &lsquo\;contents&rsquo\; does not detract from the ontological character of his explanation. On the other hand\, he uses language that suggests a commitment to both particularised properties and ideal species. In my talk\, I will show that acknowledging this ambivalence is only a first step. If colour moments are neither &lsquo\;self-individualising&rsquo\;\, as Husserl calls it\, nor parts of what they belong to\, they cannot be particulars. Phenomenologically\, there is no way to justify that colours self-provide their principle of individuation. If\, on the other hand\, the (supposed) particularity of a colour moment is to be derived from the particularity of the subject\, then there is no way around invoking at least part of the surface or a piece of the relevant thing. If so\, there will always be a more plausible candidate for the relevant particular than a colour moment\, namely\, a coloured surface or piece of the subject. A coloured surface or piece of a particular size is\, of course\, a countable particular or individual. But this is metaphysically unexciting. I will conclude by extrapolating some morals from the discussion of Husserl for the interpretation of Brentano&rsquo\;s late ontology.
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