Moral luck is the phenomenon which arises when luck makes a difference to a moral property. More precisely\, there is moral luck whenever two situations are similar in respects we ordinarily consider morally relevant &ndash\; such as an agent&rsquo\;s intention\, motives or control &ndash\; but differ in their moral evaluation. For instance\, if there is a moral difference between a case of attempted murder and similar case of (successful) murder\, then moral luck exists. Many questions can be asked about moral luck:
\n1- \; \; \; \; \; \; \;How pervasive is moral luck\, if it is? \;Is it restricted to deontic properties such as permissions and duties\, or does it extend to hypological notions like responsibility and blameworthiness\, or even to aretaic concepts such as generosity or cowardice?
\n2- \; \; \; \; \; \;How many kinds of moral luck are there? Thomas Nagel famously distinguished four kinds\; is that classification complete or even correct?
\n3- \; \; \; \; \; \;It is difficult to decide what should be held fixed between two cases when determining whether there is moral luck. For instance\, it is unacceptable not to hold fixed intentions in the comparison\, but it is acceptable not to hold fixed distant consequences. What about the (immediate) \;result \;of our actions?
\n4- \; \; \; \; \; \;The previous question shows that it could be that whether we accept moral luck or not depends on our account of what an action is. Are there accounts of action that make moral luck more or less hospitable? Impossible?
\nProject's website: \;https://web1.unine.ch/the-defence-first-approach-to-responsibility/
ORGANIZER;CN=Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette;CN="Robin Timothée Bianchi";CN=Vincent Grandjean;CN="Patricia Sánchez Oliva";CN=Antoine Dang Van: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR